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EDITORIAL 
TORTURE AND THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT 
"If it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the UN, 
we should keep our heads down and avoid siding against 
Indonesia. " 
Sir John Ford, British Ambassador in Jakarta, in a confidential 
letter to the Foreign Office, 21 July 1975. 
On 3rd December 1980, Lord Strathcoma, a Minister at the 
Foreign Office told the House of Lords: 
"We would not sell equipment which, in our judgement, could 
be used for internal repression, to a regime which is known to 
practise torture" 
The next day, Lord Avebury, in a Lords debate on E. 
Timor, quoted this statement and condemned Britain's sale 
of Hawk aircraft to Indonesia: 
"Of course it is said that we are selling only the trainer version 
but if the manufacturers claim it is so easy to convert, how could 
we prevent the Indonesians from doing it? . .. The Hawk aircraft 
can certainly be used for internal repression. It would be an ideal 
weapon to use against villages of E. Timor into which the Indo-
nesian colonialists and aggressors have herded the population. By 
the simple modification in the field of adding pylons to the 
wings, bombs, rockets, napalm and so on could be deployed 
against the civilian population." 
Lord Avebury referred to recent reports of torture 
published by TAPOL, mentioning specifically the gruesone 
account of torture employed against Acehnese political 
prisoners in late 1979 (see TAPOL Bulletin, 39, July 1980). 
This present issue contains a chilling account of mal-
treatment and torture by A. M. Fatwa, in October 1980. 
These instances of torture are known because the victims 
have been in a position to publicise them, but they are only 
a tiny part of the whole picture. The victims of torture in 
E. Timor and W. Irian have virtually no chance of bringing 
their experiences to world attention, though we are now 
learning a great deal about summary executions and dis-
appearances in these two places. 
" ... keep our heads down and avoid siding against Indo-
-nesia". This is surely a most accurate description of British 
government policy, not only since 1975 but since 1965 
when the Army took over in the wake of massacres and 
mass arrests, and all through the period of repression of 
students, Muslims and other government opponents. And at 
each new stage of repression, rep9rts of torture have sooner 
or later emerged. Yet throughout, no British government, 
Labour or Tory, regardless of any proclaimed adherence to 
human rights principles, has been deflected from the course 
of providing aid, military as well as economic, and of 
supplying military equipment, in increasing amounts to the 
Indonesian government. 
Now that a minister in the present government has made 
a fairly categorical statement refusing to sell repressive 
equipment to governments that employ torture, it is time 
to press the government to place an embargo on the sale of 
military equipment to Indonesia. We therefore urge TAPOL 
readers in the UK to write to the British government direct, 
or through their MPs, protesting against the sale of Hawks 
to Indonesia, and demanding that no further sales of 
equipment "which could be used for internal repression" 
should be permitted. Address your letters to: 
Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary, Foreign Office, 
London SWl or write to your MP, House of Commons 
London SW 1. ' 
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SERIOUS ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS OCCUR IN CENTRAL JAVA 
Anti-Chinese riots swept through Central Java last Novem-
ber causing widespread material damage and creating an 
atmosphere of terror for the Chinese community. Numer-
ous factories, houses and vehicles were destroyed, and 
commerce in several major towns and cities was brought to 
a standstill for days on end. Eight rioters are reported to 
have been shot dead by troops trying, in many cases with 
little effect, to quell the riots. There are reports too of 
physical attacks on Chinese. Several thousand youths were 
rounded up, and an undisclosed number are still being held. 
The riots started in Solo, a town situated on the south 
coast of Central Java and renowned as one of the two main 
centres of Javanese culture. After four days of devastating 
attacks on Chinese-owned property, the riots shifted to 
Semarang, the provincial capital and headquarters of the 
Central Java Military Command. They proceeded for several 
days unabated in Semarang, spreading at the same time to 
other places in the province and across the border into East 
Java. 
The riots were sparked off by a minor street accident on 
Wednesday 19th November when a cyclist, a student at the 
Solo sports teachers' college, collided with a pedestrian, a 
schoolboy of Chinese origin. When a row broke out 
between the two, another Chinese intervened, attacking the 
cyclist and inflicting a head injury on him. As passions rose, 
the two Chinese fled from the scene and took refuge in a 
nearby Chinese shop. The cyclist quickly reported the 
incident to his fellow students, who went in a group to the 
shop, demanding that the boys give themselves up. Predict-
ably, the boys had already left and were nowhere to be 
found. 
The next day the students made a second visit to the 
shop, somewhat illogically again demanding that the 
Chinese give themselves up. When they got no satisfaction, 
they started throwing stones at the shop and at other 
Chinese shops in the same street. The riots quickly spread 
to other parts of the town, and worsened after one of the 
rioters was shot dead by troops. The rioters consisted 
mainly of students and school pupils. They continued 
unabated for three days, coming to a climax on Sunday, 
23rd November, when hundreds of youths, riding motor-
bikes at high speed in compact groups, combed the town in 
what appeared to be a well-organised fashion, setting fire 
to offices, houses, factories and vehicles, and moving 
quickly from one target to the next with hardly any oppos-
ition from the authorities. 
On Monday, as things quietened down in Solo, the gangs 
of motor-cyclists moved to Semarang, more than a hundred 
miles to the north. These "attack-group contingents", as 
they were called, joined forces with school-pupils in Semar-
ang to continue the trail of destruction. The riots proceed-
ed for several days in the provincial capital, causing even 
more damage than in Solo. At the same time, "attack-troop 
contingents" moved into other towns in the province, 
creating havoc everywhere. Towns known to have been 
seriously affected include Kendal, Kudus, Pemalang, Peka-
longan, Purwodadi, Pati, Jepara, Cepu and Rembang, as 
well as several towns in East Java, including Madiun, Ngawi 
and Jombang. 
Curlews Ignored 
The Army and the Police in Solo appear to have been taken 
completely by surprise by the intensity and scale of the 
riots. Little was done to prevent them from spreading, 
not only within the town, but to other towns many miles 
away. Curfews were imposed in Solo, Semarang and other 
towns, but were frequently violated with no apparent 
consequences for the violators. The behaviour of the 
troops, who fired on rioters on a number of occasions, 
causing many illjuries and deaths, only whipped up emot-
ions even further, with disastrous consequences not for the 
troops or the authorities but for the beleaguered and 
defenceless Chinese. 
One indication of the lack of determination of the Army 
to protect the victims of these riots is the fact that, even 
though it was being said that there were not enough troops 
in Solo to cope, many troops and officers stationed there 
left the town on Saturday, 22nd November, at the height 
of the riots, to attend a military installation ceremony 
several miles away, an event which could easily have been 
postponed. It was not till Wednesday, 26th November, a 
full week after the trouble started, that the military comm-
ander of Central Java, Major-General Sukotjo, issued a 
statement promising "stern measures". 
News Blackout 
For the first few days, the only response to come from 
Admiral Sudomo, commander of the Army's security 
command, KOPKAMTIB, was to impose a complete news 
blackout. This decision is widely acknowledged to have 
made things far worse by creating a situation in which 
rumours spread rapidly. Sudomo's justification was that 
media reporting might encourage the rioters and cause the 
riots to spread. But this is precisely what did happen, 
despite the blackout. The people organising the riots clearly 
had no difficulty planning their strategy. They had their 
own system of communication whilst the general public 
were left to feed on unsubstantiated rumours. 
Foreign news reporters in Jakarta were not permitted to 
visit the riot-stricken areas and obtained most of their 
information from phone-calls to Chinese in the cities 
affected. Some journalists who managed to take photo-
graphs of ravaged areas had their film or their cameras 
confiscated. The only national newspaper to question the 
blackout was Merdeka which stated editorially {28th 
November) that gagging the press only engendered confus-
ion, especJally "since it has become an open secret that 
discord and conflicts have arisen in the government and the 
social forces backing it". (Quoted by AFP, 28th November 
1980). On 2nd December, the Indonesian Journalists Assoc-
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iation issued a statement urging the government to provide 
an explanation "to prevent confusing reports being received 
by the community" (AFP, 2nd December). 
Sudomo Urges Chinese Community 
to "Behave Properly" 
As for the Chinese, the defenceless victims of these riots, 
they obtained little comfort from any of the official pro-
nouncements. A statement from President Suharto, follow-
ing an emergency Cabinet meeting on 24th November , 
pointed out that Chinese technical know-how was "still" 
needed "for the time being" , a statement which must have 
made Chinese ponder seriously over their future prospects 
in Indonesia. 
In a press statement issued on 8th December, Admiral 
Sudomo actually warned the Chinese of the need to "carry 
out introspection, display social solidarity, behave properly 
and at all times conform with their social environment". 
(Tempo, 13th December 1980) 
* No-one has yet offered a serious analysis of the political 
background to the riots though few doubt that they were 
well organised and , apart from the initial developments on 
the first Wednesday, far from being spontaneous. In his 
press statement, Sudomo claimed that the riots were aimed 
at "launching a revolution which would commence in 
Central Java by inciting anti-Chinese sentiments or racialism 
and utilising students and pupils as the main implement-
ors". (Tempo, 13th December 1980). He gave no hint as to 
who he thought stood behind this "revolution", but as 
'{en:ipo obliquely points out in the same issue, he clearly 
intends to use this conclusion as justification for intens-
ifying the Army's grip on society . It is noteworthy that the 
"Sapujagat" operations (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 41/42, 
September-November 1980) do not yet extend to Central 
Java but have so far been confined to West Java and 
Sumatra. 
The school population in many urban areas is riven with 
inter-school rivalries and gang "warfare". In Solo, gangs 
MORE THREATS FOR FOREIGN MEDIA 
Radio Australia 
The Indonesian Government still hopes to persuade the 
Australian government to put an end to Indonesian lang-
uage broadcasts by Radio Australia which are beamed nine 
hours a day and reach an audience of some 30 million Indo-
nesians. Radio Australia's news gathering activities in Indo-
nesia came to a halt early last year when its chief reporter, 
Warwick Butler, was refused renewal of his work permit 
and other staff replacements were refused visas. 
When Australian Broadcasting Commission officials 
visited Jakarta in December 1980, hoping to re-open 
Radio Australia's office, they faced a demand from the 
Indonesian authorities that they should either stop the 
Indonesian-language broadcasts altogether or that the 
broadcasts should refrain from reporting anything about 
Indonesia. 
referred to as gali (short for gabungan anak-anak liar , or 
wild-kid gangs) have become a feature of life, dominatfug 
the amusement arcades, roaming the streets and even oper-
ating protection rackets . Generally speaking, these gali are 
organised on strictly racial lines . In a society where no out-
let for the expression of democratic opinion is permitted , 
gangs like these become the channel for social frustrations 
over worsening economic conditions, corruption and the 
ever-widening gap between rich and poor. The Chinese , a 
small percentage of whom engage in business activities, are 
quickly identified as being part of the elite and are thus an 
easy scapegoat for everyone. Their vulnerability has wors-
ened in the past few years because some of the best-known 
business houses known to be collaborating with the 
generals , including Suharto and his wife, are Chinese. In 
fact , Mrs Suharto holds major investments in at least two 
of the factories vandalised in Solo, the Batik Kris enterprise 
and Solo Optical. 
STOP PRESS 
At the end of December , Sudomo announced that some of 
those arrested in connection with the riots could be 
released if "their pesantran" (Muslim religious school) 
would "provide written guarantees" (Tempo, 27th Decem-
ber 1980). He gave no further details. 
Some independent observers are now suggesting that the 
government may be trying to place the blame for the riots 
on the · Muslims , the major political challenge to the Army 
as the 1982 elections draw near. It was Interior Minister. 
Amir Machmud who was alleging in September last that 
"G30S/PKI" or ex-tapol elements were planning a political 
comeback, and intended to infiltrate Muslim organisations. 
Sudomo's assertions about attempts to launch a "revolu-
tion" in Central Java by means of the riots may soon turn 
out to be an extension of this theory. 
There are also strong indications that the riots are 
closely connected with the power struggle taking place 
among the generals surrounding Suharto . 
Indonesia's latest grievance concerns Radio Australia's 
reports about the anti-Chinese riots at a time when a black-
out on news of these events was in force throughout Indo-
nesia. Radio Australia news therefore became the main if 
not only source of information for millions of Indonesian 
listeners. 
Radio Finland 
A half-hour programme in mid-October on Radio Finland 
about the political situation in Indonesia and the question 
of East Timar led to a formal complaint from the Indones-
ian Embassy in Helsinki. In a letter to the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry, the Embassy claimed that the programme "con-
tained one-sided information, negative and unfair towards 
Indonesia" and represented "interference in the domestic 
policy of a friendly country". 
The Embassy's assumption that Radio Finland is a 
"state-controlled institution" is quite false, and the com-
plaint therefore fell on deaf ears. 
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MASS MURDERS IN BURU: 
DEATH LISTS RECEIVED 
Eleven tapols were shot dead on a single day in 1972 at 
Unit V in the Buru penal labour camp, and three others 
who escaped were killed shortly afterwards. A year later, 
six ta pols were shot dead over a period of four days at the 
Jiku Kecil special punishment camp for Buru detainees. 
This information is contained in lists giving details of 
319 ta pols who were killed or died of various causes during 
their detention on Buru. Altogether 39 men are listed as 
having been killed by guards. Fifteen suicides are listed, 
several of which are directly linked with torture and ma).-
treatment by guards. Twenty-six men died after an escape 
attempt from Unit II, and one man who gave himself up 
after this escape was later shot dead. 
The set of lists was made available to TAPOL a few 
months ago. There are separate lists for each of the 21 
regular units on Buru (Nos I to XVIII, and the R, S and T 
units) ltnd for the Jiku Kecil special punishment camp 
which was later moved to 'Ancol', cynically named after 
the well-know recreation resort on the outskirts of Jakarta. 
The lists give detailed information about each man inclu-
ding his prison registration number, year of birth, date of 
death, marital status, religion, home address and cause of 
death. In several instances where men were killed by guards, 
the name of the soldier or soldiers responsible is also given. 
The list for Unit V states that the eleven men shot dead 
on 6th October 1972 were killed by soldiers of Battalion 
733 of the Pattirnura (Maluku) Division who were in charge 
of guarding Units III, V and VI. 
The 1973 killings at Jiku Kecil are also described in a 
recently-published book by the Australian journalist, 
Hamish McDonald. In Suharto's Indonesia (1980), he 
reports on a three-day visit to Buru in 1977 during which, 
he says, "No restrictions were placed on contact between 
prisoners and journalists". Of the killings in Jiku Kecil, he 
writes: 
The staging camp of Jilm Kecil became a special punishment 
centre. The hardship appears to have reached a peak in the years 
1972 and 1973, particularly towards the end of this period when 
the usual Moluccan guard battalion was replaced for a year by a 
unit from South Sulawesi, a strongly Muslim region. Late in 
1972 a month-long security disturbance (see reference above to 
the shootings in Unit V, Tapol Bulletin) led to tightened control 
of the prisoners. Those suspected of organising disturbances were 
taken to J iku Kecil. With great consistency, numerous prisoners 
alleged that guards carried out vicious beatings and torture. 
Often they were deprived of water and fed salted food so that 
they drank their own urine in desperate thirst. One man, 
Prawoto, who died of this treatment was officially reported as 
having hanged himself. In 1973 a group of prisoners from Jiku 
Kecil collecting timber angered their guard. He shot one man 
dead, then lined up the remaining five and shot them one by one 
one in the chest with a pistol. Only one survived. 
Footnoted clarifications attached to the list of deaths 
at Jiku Kecil largely corroborate McDonald's account. 
According to these footnotes, 
Prawoto bin Martodimejo died on 1st October 1972 while 
under interrogation by Captain Adam, Intelligence 
Assistant Officer at Buru Camp. 
Mustaji was tortured for eight consecutive days, and finally 
committed suicide. 
Suwamo Ciptosupono was shot "after surrendering, with 
his hands up" 
Gatot Widodo was shot dead on 16th November 1973, 
while in a nearby coconut garden. There were three 
bullet wounds in his body. 
Suharjono, Alex, Nono and Abdulgani were shot dead on 
18th November 1973 after being tortured for three days 
and two nights. They had been gathering timber in a 
nearby garden when they heard the shots that killed 
Gatot Widodo. They returned to J.iku Kecil, were sub-
jected to prolonged torture, then shot dead. Another 
man, Juhendi, who was shot with them, survived. 
Awang Rasawan was shot dead the next day. Kadi was hit 
by a bullet intended for Awang. He survived, but the 
bullet is still lodged in his collar bone. 
The lists of deaths on Buru also reveal that 39 men died 
as the result of accidents: 20 by drowning, 11 from falls 
from trees or from being crushed by falling trees, 5 were 
struck by lightening and 3 died from attacks by wild 
animals. The major illnesses causing death appear to have 
been hepatitis (48) and tuberculosis (38). Three men in 
Unit I "died in their sleep" on three separate days in 
August, September and October 1976, while four men in 
Unit X are described as having been killed "by local 
inhabitants". 
It is unlikely that the lists include all the deaths which 
occurred on Bum. For one thing, the last recorded deaths 
took place in July and August 1978 which is more than 15 
months before the final batch of tapols left Buru. 
JAKARTA'S POPULATION BEING 
FINGER-PRINTED 
Everyone who lives in Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, is 
now being finger-printed by the Jakarta Police in 
collaboration with the municipal government. 
Announcing this on 12th September, 1980, the 
Armed Forces daily, Angkatan Bersenjata said this is 
being done for three reasons: 
1. To establish everyone's identity, to identify 
corpses and safeguard their rights. 
2. To ensure speedy service in completing identity-
card formalities (all ·Indonesian citizens are 
required to possess identity-cards). , 
3. To provide a better means for the effective i.;ontrol 
of the population by the local authorities, and to 
help the Police to be able to apprehend criminal 
elements more speedily. 
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WEST IRIAN 
Submission to Bertrand Russell Tribunal: 
INVOLUNTARY STERILISATION OF 
PAPUANS IN WEST IRIAN 
Papuan men are being forcibly sterilised, in conflict with 
Papuan tradition, according to West Papuan representatives 
in a submission to the Bertrand Russell Tribunal which met 
in Rotterdam last November. The Tribunal which was held 
to hear complaints about the treatment of Indians in North 
and Latin America, agreed to accept complaints submitted 
by the High Court of the Chamber of Representatives of 
West Papua which has its headquarters in Delft, Holland, 
about the situation in West Papua, known in Indonesia as 
the province of West Irian. 
According to the submission, sterilisation is part of a 
massive re-population programme for West Irian which will 
eventually result in the number of Indonesians far exceed-
ing the number of Papuans in the province. There are 
already about 500,000 Indonesians there, most of whom 
have come there under the "transmigration" programme. 
This compares with a Papuan population which numbered 
one million before Indonesia's takeover of the province, 
and of these, according to the submission, about 150,000 
are estimated to have been killed or to have disappeared 
since West Irian came under Indonesian control in 1963. 
"Indonesians dominate the social life in the cities. There 
is no place left for Papuans. They feel like strangers in their 
own land ... and are forced to retreat to the forests. The 
use of the word Papuan is forbidden." 
The submission also complained of widespread job dis-
crimination (the very problem raised by Vice-President 
Adam Malik, see separate item) and said this was particular-
ly serious in Jayapura, the capital, and in Merauke, Fak-
Fak, Kaimana, Sorong, Manokwari and Biak. 
Marten Tabu Sentenced to 30 Years? 
The West Papuan representatives also told the Tribunal that 
Marten Tahu, the OPM leader who surrendered to the Indo-
nesian troops in April 1980, is shortly to be tried. (The 
Far Eastern Economic Review of 19th December 1980, 
quoting "reliable sources", reports that Tabu has already 
been tried, and was sentenced to 30 years) This wa~ des-
pite the fact that he was granted an amnesty by President 
Suharto soon after his surrender. Three other OPM leaders 
are also said to be awaiting trial: Jareth Wajoi, Abner May 
and Joel Worumi. The first two are known to have signed 
statements agreeing to collaborate with the Indonesians and 
to join the Indonesian Army, yet even so, they are now 
scheduled for trial. 
The submission also gives the names of three Papuan 
political prisoners who have died as a result of maltreat-
ment since the beginning of this year. They are Baldus 
Mofu (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 39, May 1980), Michael 
Wajoi and Mathias Tata-Rawaji. 
According to a report in the Dutch weekly, De Groene 
Amsterdammer in November 1980, Marten Tahu is being 
held in detention in Dok V, the headquarters of Brigadier-
General Santosa the military commander of West Irian. 
The journal also 'reported that a unit of OPM guerrillas led 
by Marten Tabu's brother, Matias Tahu: ~ttacked a ~ro.up of 
Indonesian officials who were on a VlSlt to the d1stnct of 
Mamberamo Hilir, 300 kilometres south of Jayapura. 
Six census-takers were killed in the encounter. The other 
members of the group which included military as well as 
civilian officials, are being held as hostages, and will only be 
released in exchange for the release of Marten Tahu. 
OPM CHARGE IS "THE 
KISS OF DEATH", SAYS MP 
Critical remarks made by Indonesia's Vice-President Adam 
Malik about the administration of West Irian, following a 
visit to the province in October 1980, drew a rueful res-
ponse from a Papuan member of Indonesia's ~ar~ament. 
"If people in West Irian made such remarks, said Steef 
Patrick Nafuni who represents the PDI (National Party), 
"they would be accused of all manner of things, and they 
would be interrogated in connection with the Free Papua 
Movement (OPM)." (Kompas, 5th November 1980.) While 
welcoming Adam Malik's criticisms, Mr Nafuni said: 
"People in West Irian fear being branded as members of the 
OPM just as much as people in Java fear being branded as 
members of the PKI. The PKI charge means nothing to 
people there," he said, "but the OPM charge is 'the kiss of 
death'". 
The MP's remark followed a report in Kompas (31st 
October 1980) that Vice-President Adam Malik told Presid-
ent Suharto , after his visit to West Irian, of a number of 
serious problems, in particular the very low wages paid to 
government officials and the serious lack of employment 
opportunities for ''local people"*). An earlier item in 
Kompas, filed from Jayapura, the capital of West Irian. 
during the course of Adam Mali.k's visit, quoted him as 
warning officials there that far too little has been done to 
place "local people" in positions of responsibility within 
the administration. "Because we have failed to do this, we 
are encountering the problems we now face in security 
affairs," he said, warning that it was wrong to think that 
security can be solved by bringing in more troops. The 
problems there must be solved "sociologically and anthrop-
ologically". (Kompas, 23 October 1980) 
In his statement, Mr Nafuni also said that he had fre-
quently stressed that more "local people" should be given 
positions of authority, but his remarks has always "created 
difficulties" for his party colleagues in the province. He 
went on: "Some officials in West Irian even seem to think 
that if too many people originating from the region were to 
occupy important posts, a Papuan state could come into 
existence." 
.... 
*As reported elsewhere on this page the word "Papuan" 
is proscribed. Papuans are therefore referred to as anak 
daerah or "local people" 
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1. From 15th October when the press reported that I 
would preach at the Idul Adha prayer-meeting in Kuningan 
Square, Setia Budi (South Jakarta), my home was watched 
night and day by intel [l] men , and I was often followed 
when I went out. Some inte/ men tried to enter the grounds 
of my home but this was difficult because Muslim youth 
had been keeping guard for some time. They had taken this 
initiative out of a sense of solidarity after hearing that my 
family and I were being terrorised and intimidated. 
2. On 18th October, the chairman of the Idul Adha (Fest-
ival of Sacrifice) Prayer-Meeting Committee informed me 
that my sermon had been cancelled, under pressure from 
the authorities. 
3. I decided therefore to attend the Idul Adha prayer-
meeting on 19th October at Cut Mutiah Square, together 
with General Nasution whose sermon, which was to have 
been delivered there, had also been cancelled. When I left 
home I was followed by two intel vehicles and several 
motor-cycles. , After prayers, I spoke to several 
intel officers from the Cut Mutiah army office, including 
Lieutenant-Colonel Simbolon. I asked him to stop surr-
ounding my house and having me followed. I had, after all, 
complied with the ban against me as a preacher . He laughed 
and said: "It won't happen again." But when I drove off to 
General Nasution's house I was trailed by the same cars, 
plus others. They even parked quite conspicuously outside 
the General's home. 
4. From there I went to Al-Bayinah Mosque in Setia Budi 
to see H. Nuri who had been detained by Koramil [2] after 
he had announced that I would preach at the Friday prayer-
meeting at his Mosque. The Koramil commander was det-
ermined that neither Syaf ruddin Prawiranegara nor I should 
preach in his district, and someone had even overheard him 
say that he would "kill someone" rather than have his 
career ruined. I was also planning to visit H. Mawin, chair-
man of the committee that had invited me to preach, 
because I heard that he and his family were being terrorised 
by Army personnel. 
5. Outside the Mosque, I met several mosque officials and 
congregants. Some of them, especially H. Nuri, who had 
just been released the night before, embraced me very 
warmly. 
6. On the way home, just as I was about to call on H. 
Mawin, I was ordered to stop by some soldiers under the 
command of Captain Kaelani, Intel Assistant at the South 
Jakarta Kodim, a well-known man in the locality. When I 
refused to accompany them unless they could produce a 
warrant, they dragged me out. In the scuffle, my foot 
slipped on the kerb. Bystanders who spoke up on my behalf 
were warned that they would be arrested. When a friend 
tried to stay with me and came towards the intel car into 
which I was being hustled, somone ordered his arrest. I 
managed to push him away from the car. I was then driven 
away in the intel cai. It was by then about 9.00am and 
many friends witnessed these events. 
7. There were four in tel officers in the car which careered 
around the Menteng District. The men threatened to go at 
MUSLIM LEADER REPC 
Dr. A . M Fatwa, an outspoken Muslim critic of the Inc. 
(see TAPOL Bulletin No. 40, July 1980, page 7) has frei 
months in detention in 1978 after the crackdown agai 
Suharto's re-election as President in March 1978. In Augu 
mosque service (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 41/42, September 
In October, the Army again prevented critics, includin~ 
the Festival of Sacrifice. Intelligence personnel spied on p 
veillance. He was arrested, and, together with some mosque 
The following is a slightly abridged translation of Fatw, 
methods of terror used by the Army, it also shows how 
Fatwa was injured not by Army officers but by a street mo/ 
very high speed and prevent me from k~eping the door 
closed. The car could overturn, they said, and we might all 
be killed . Captain Kaelani made contact through his walkie-
talkie with the Kodim commander and the First Assistant 
(Intelligence) of Jakarta's Laksusda to inform them that he 
had secured "the goods", and to ask where he should now 
take me. "To Room 6", came the reply. We then drove to 
Setia Budi Koramil. Here the Koramil commander dragged 
me out of the car, badly damaging my shoes. In the 
Koramil office, I was thrown down onto a chair. The 
commander then began to beat me with his fists, striking 
me in the face, head, ears and jaws. He also kicked me in 
the head, the chest and the legs. 
8. During a pause, the Kodim commander who was also in 
the room, ordereq the arrest of members of the Al-Bayinah 
Mo~que Committee. Soon afterwards, three of them 
appeared - H. Mawin, H. Ramli and another man whose 
name I don't know, They were shouted at and beaten for 
allowing me into their locality without reporting it to the 
authorities. H. Mawin was treated the worst. He was punch-
ed and kicked by the Kodim commander, and fell to the 
floor. Then Second lieutenant Sukarman, the Koramil 
commander, started beating me again, this time with two 
other soldiers, though these two didn't beat hard. lieu-
tenant Sukarman told me to drink some tea from a bottle 
on his table. He tried to force the bottle into my mouth 
which only made me splutter and choke, so he threw the 
liquid at me, drenching my clothes. He grabbed the Bugis 
Bone cap I was wearing, threw it to the floor and trampled 
on it. He pulled off a scarf I had wrapped round my'"head to 
protect it. I responded to each of his blows by chanting, 
"Allahuakhbar!" though he told me not to. He said that he 
was a fanatic Muslim, and the Kodim commander, a lieu-
t~nant-colonel said: "I'm more fanatical than you. You 
only ·use religion to create trouble." He complained that he 
hadn't been able to sleep for five days and nights because of 
me. 
9. After further consultations with the First Assistant of 
the Laksusda, H. Mawin and I were transferred to Satgas 
Intel in Banteng Sqaure. H. Ramli and his colleagues were 
allowed to return to the mosque. 
10. At Satgas Intel, H. Mawin and I were dragged into the 
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RTS MAL-TREATMENT 
onesian government and signatory of the Petition-of-Fifty 
luently suffered persecution by the Army. He spent several 
~st Muslim criticisms of the 1977 general election and of 
~t this year, he was prevented from preaching at a Lebaran 
tNovember 1980, page 10). 
*A. M. Fatwa, from preaching in mosques during Idul Adha, 
irayer-meetings and kept people like Fatwa under close sur-
~officials, severely beaten up. 
fq 's chilling account of his experiences. Besides revealing the 
~ts intelligence men contrived to create the impression that 
:l!1). 
A. M. Fatwa 
office and thrown heavily against a wall. We both fell to the 
floor. Then we were dragged out to the back yard and 
beaten up. I saw H. Mawin bleeding after his mouth had 
been struck. The soldiers beating me were led by Captain 
Thomas, a Satgas intel officer, formerly commander of 
Senen Koramil. After a while, Captain Thomas ordered me 
to make a speech "to arouse people's passions" as I was "in 
the habit of doing", as he put it. I could not even open my 
mouth, as both my jaws had been so badly beaten. He 
started beating me again while another soldier pushed me 
backwards and forwards, kicking me from behind. Each 
time they beat me, I shouted "Allahuakhbar!" although 
Captain Thomas said it would not help, and could even 
make things worse. When the soldiers took a rest, I was 
ordered to stand upright and still. The beating only came to 
an end when another intel officer led me away to a diff-
erent room, sat me down gently on a chair, brought me a 
drink and food {though I couldn't eat) and brought me a 
mat so that I could say my midday prayer. I don't know his 
name, but he was the person who saved me from further 
torture. 
11. Then, Lieutenant-Colonel Kosman, Commander of 
Satgas Intel, turned up. When he saw my swollen face, he 
said: "This is the work of criminals. He's been beaten by a 
mob of people, hasn't he?" When the soldiers replied, 
"Yes", he said: "If that's the case, I don't want him here. 
Take him back to Koramil, or better still, to the police 
station". 
12. Then, when H. Mawin and I were alone with Captain 
Kaelani, he told us he was from a devout Muslim family in 
Palembang who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca for 
several generations back. I took this opportunity to tell him 
how surprised I was that he could treat his fellow human 
beings in this way, and I told him I hoped I was the last 
person he would beat up like this. His eyes began to 
moisten. I asked him why he was crying, and he said: "I 
know how you feel. I would feel like that too if my son or 
daughter were treated like this. Don't think I'm not afraid 
of karma [3] ." When I asked him whether we would be 
beaten up again when we returned to the Koramil office, he 
replied: "I am in charge. I assure you I will not let anyone 
touch you again ." 
13. After preparations had been comple,ted, we were driven 
in an Army vehicle to the police station. I said I wanted to 
sit in the back with H. Mawin but I had to sit in the front, 
in between the driver and Captain Kaelani with another 
guard sitting behind. When we reached Malang Canal Road, 
just in front of the Setia Budi administrative office and 
about four hundred metres from the police-station, there 
was a group of masked men standing in the road, When the 
car stopped, they pulled open the doors. The driver and 
Captain Kaelani quickly jumped out, and the men got in 
and started beating me up. Again I cried "Allahuakhbar!" 
each .tiine I was beaten. They pulled me by the legs but I 
clung to the steering-wheel feeling sure it would be much 
worse if they managed to get me out of the car. They might 
even have thrown me into the canal. 
14. Strangely, this assault stopped of its own accord, 
without any intervention by the authorities. I only heard 
Captain Kaelani say: "Okay, that's enough" whereupon the 
men disbanded and the car in which we were travelling 
proceeded down the road to the police-station. I felt that 
God had protected me, in response to my prayers. 
15. At the police-station, Captain Kaelani showed me five 
men, saying "These are the men who beat you up. We 
didn't catch them all." Then I saw them being taken to a 
cell and was told to listen while they were struck, but 
the "cries of pain" didn't sound at all real. It was no sur-
prise to hear later, from a reliable source, that the men 
"who had been arrested by the police were taken to the 
Laksusda office". 
16. I then heard Captain Kaelani phone the Kodim comm-
ander and the First Assistant of Laksusda to report that a 
mob had attacked me and that I was badly injured. The 
captain left, and later returned with orders for me to be 
allowed home for treatment. He also said that criminal 
charges could be made through the police. H. Mawin who 
was not so badly injured as me went home, and I was 
taken by two policemen in a taxi to the Islamic Hospital, as 
I had requested. 
17. On my first night at the hospital, numerous phone-
calls were received from unknown persons threatening to 
kidnap me. 
18.Conclusion It is quite untrue to say that I was beaten up 
by an unknown mob. The truth is that I was arrested by an 
officer of the Army, Captain Kaelani, intel officer of South 
Continued on page 8, lower half. 
T APOL Bulletin No 43 January 1981 7 
SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS 
IN THE CAMPUSES 
No fewer than 30 students have been expelled from state 
universities in various parts of Indonesia, under pressure 
from Daud Joesoef, the Minister for Education. A far great~ 
er number have been suspended from studies for periods of 
up to a year. Expulsion and suspension have thus become 
the current government tactic for for~ing students to con-
form with its plan to depoliticise the campuses. 
The expulsions and suspensions have led to lecture 
strikes in several universities. In December, students at the 
Bandung Institute of Technology went on a three-day strike 
in protest against the suspension of Yayat Nurhayat, chair-
man of the Student Council. The existence of the council 
itself is a defiant challenge to the government which has 
ordered,. under its 'normalisation' programme, that all 
student councils should be disbanded and replaced by close-
ly supervised faculty-student bodies. 
At the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, a lecture strike 
also took place in November 1980, when Elbiner Tobing, a 
student of the Faculty of Social Sciences, was expelled, 
after being under a suspension order since 1979. His ex-
pulsion came after he led a student delegation to Parliament 
to protest against Army intrusions on the university's 
campus and in particular against the incident on 25th 
October when a number of students were injured. 
Campus Meetings Prevented 
October and November are months that abound in Indones-
ian history with commemorative days and have in the past 
few years become_ m_onths of confrontation between the 
students and the Army. True to form, this happened again 
this year. 
The first and most serious of the incidents occurred on 
25th October when armed troops broke up a two-day 
seminar being held on the campus of the University of 
Indonesia to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Vi's 
Student Council. In defiance of a prohibition by the Jakar-
Continued from page 7. 
!akarta Kodiin. The first round of beating up which also 
~eluded torture was carried out by an officer, Second-
Lieutenant Sukarman, member of the Setia Budi Koramil 
who wa~ wear~g his military uniform. This took place at 
the Seti.a Bud1 Koramil office, in the presence of the 
commander of the South Jakarta Kodim. The incident was 
also ~itnessed by members of the Al-Bayinah Mosque 
Committee. The second round of beating, which also incl-
uded torture, occurred at the office of Satgas Intel of 
Laksusda, at No. 34 Banteng Square, with Captain Thomas, 
an officer on the staff of Satgas Intel, in charge. The third 
round, which included an assault as well as torture took 
place inside an Army car at a time when I was still ~nder 
guard and in the charge of Captain Kaelani and an Army 
sergeant. Although I don't know the identity of the people 
who made the assault, there is absolutely no reason to 
doubt that the incident was stage-managed and well 
organised beforehand. 
ta Military Command, Chris Siner Key Timu, a signatory of 
the P~tition-of-50 (see Tapol Bulletin No. 40) attended, and 
was about to deliver a speech when troops moved in to pre-
vent this. The Army was also angered by the presence of 
General Nasution who had been invited as a special guest. 
According to one report, General Nasution was dragged out 
by troops; according to another he was requested by the 
Rector to join him in his office. (The incident was not 
directly reported in the press following a news blackout 
imposed by KOPKAMTIB.) 
When students tried to hold back the troops and prevent 
them from entering the hall, they were beaten with rifle-
butts. Fourteen were injured, one seriously. 
Three days later, on 28th October, Youth Pledge Day, a 
poetry-reading on campus had to be cancelled when 
students who turned up for the event found the campus 
already occupied by troops. Care had been taken on this 
occasion not to invite "controversial" people, but this 
failed to save the meeting. 
The third meeting enjoyed a better fate. This was the 
meeting ht'.ld on campus on 10th November, Heroes Day, 
scheduled for late in the afternoon. Many students had 
been on campus since morning, and by the time the 
meeting was due to commence, the hall was filled 
to capacity with about 3,000 people. But the campus by 
this time was surrounded by troops, and the gates were 
locked well before the meeting was due to start. Large 
crowds of people who had turned up hoping to attend 
could not get it, but were able to follow the proceedings 
from loud-speakers. The meeting was addressed among 
others by Lukman Hakim and Hariman Siregar, both 
former chairmen of the UI Student Council and both of 
whom have been tried in the past few years. Buyung Nasut-
ion , the human rights lawyer, also spoke. 
Sources: Tempo, 22nd November and 13th December· 
Radio Nederland Hilversum, 28th October;Pelita, 29th 
October; and NRC-Hanselblad, 12th November. 
19. May the Lord God Almighty grant his humble servant 
protection. Amen. 
Jakarta, 22 October 1980 
Footnotes 
1. intel: a widely used term in Indonesian both for the 
intelligence services .as well as for the med who work for 
them. 
2. Glossary of military terms 
Koramil: The lowest-level military command. 
Kodim: District military command above Koramil 
and below Kodim which is the provin~ial-level 
command. 
Laksu~da: The. provinc~al military commanders are 
also. ~ven ~pec1al secunty powers, signified by the 
add1t10nal title of Laksusda. 
Satgas: "Special :ra~ks" units set up by the Army at 
~entr~l and provmcia! command levels, in charge of 
intelligence . operations against "subversion". 
3. karma: t?e. notion that good or bad deeds will inevitably 
earn therr 3ust rewards or punishments. 
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EASTTIMOR: 
MORE EXECUTIONS REPORTED 
Since June 1980 when Indonesian troops occupying East 
Timor came under renewed attack from guerrilla units 
operating on the outskirts of Dili , the capital, there has 
been a marked increase in the level of repression. Reports 
are now being received - mainly from Timorese who have 
reached Portugal in the last few months and from Indones-
ians or foreigners who have visited East Timor - that num-
erous arrests were made in the aftermath of the June raids. 
An Amnesty International Urgent Action circular, issued 
on 14th November 1980, estimated the arrests at between 
80 and 100, and said: "A number of East Timorese are 
known to have disappeared after having been captured or 
arrested ... It is believed that some of them may have been 
executed." The circular calls for special action on behalf 
of David Ximenes, who St"rved for a time in the Indonesian 
Army . He was arrested and disappeared in June. 
Henry Kamm, in a dispatch from Jakarta (New York 
Times, 9th December 1980), puts the number of arrests 
since June at around 200, and states that "reliable Timorese 
sources reported that several hundred inhabitants of 
mountain areas around Dili, from where the insurgents are 
believed to have come , have been driven from their homes , 
either to camps around Dili or to banishment to the off-
shore island of Atauro. Their mountain shacks were report-
ed to have been burnt." 
In June, the guerrillas struck in three different places 
around Dili , taking occupying troops completely by sur-
prise. The raids also proved that resistance to Indonesian 
occupation is widespread and is not confined to the eastern 
sector of the country, as was previously thought. Moreover, 
the raids and the subsequent reprisals appear to have stiff-
ened resistance. Henry Kamm explained it thus: 
Despite the reprisals, a foreigner reported that Fretilin 
struck again the following month, attacking a fuel dump 
between Dili and its airport . .. Catholic sources report-
ed that Fretilin 's brief resurgence in the city has deepen-
ed the visible animosity of Timorese to occupying sold-
iers and heightened Fretilin's residual popularity. 
Three Catholics Executed 
The Timor Information Service (November 1980), publish-
ed in Victoria , Australia , giv ~ the following account rec-
eived from an Indonesian visitor to Dili: 
.. . Several nights after the (June) attack, three promin-
ent Dili Catholics approached staff of the Junior Semin-
ary at Lahane near Dare (one of the three places where 
raids took place, T APOL Bulletin) seeking food and 
shelter. They told the Seminary head that during the 
attack they were forced by the guerrillas to carry capt-
ured arms and ammunition back to the bush. They re-
turned to Dili, but being afraid of possible Indonesian 
reprisals , they hid in the bush on the outskirts of the 
capital. Hunger had forced them to try the Seminary for 
help . 
Initially the three were told that the Seminary could not 
offer sanctuary because that might put the Seminary in 
trouble with the military as well. Later, however, the 
Seminary head contacted the Dili Bishop who wouldn 't 
go to Lahane because of the curfew but he did agree to 
interview the three men the following morning. Follow-
ing the interview, the Bishop and Seminary head made 
representations to the Indonesian military intelligence 
body in Dill , saying that they would vouch for the three 
men - that they were not involved by choice in the 
June incident. 
According to our source, the three men were then taken 
by the Indonesian military and handed over to a Hansip 
(local militia) group which took them to Dare Seminary. 
There, on a games court, the three were executed. Their 
bodies were rolled down a nearby slope. As of early 
August, their bodies remained because people were 
afraid to retrieve them for burial. 
Trabhalista Leader Executed 
Timor Newsletter (December 1980), reporting on the 
content of letters received from East Timar by Timorese 
refugees in Llsbon, quoted one letter which decribed the 
execution of Arbao Martins, leader of the right-wing 
Trabhalista party who was being held in an Indonesian 
prison : 
. . . before they took him to be killed he cried and wrote 
Continued on page 11, lower half 
Dr. Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury, with Father 
Francisco Fernandes, refugee priest from East Timor, and Mr. 
Au Sei Ki, during their visit to London in July 1980. Dr. 
Runcie, Primate of the world Anglican Church, gave the East 
Timor visitors assurances of d~ep sympathy and concern for 
the tragic plight of the people of East Timor. 
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HOUSE OF LORDS DISCUSS EAST TIMOR 
On 4th December 1980, the House of Lords debated East 
Timar on the initiative of Lord Avebury of t~-.... Liberal 
Party who also chairs the All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Human Rights . The debate came two \\'.eeks after the New 
Statesman had been served a High Court injunction, on the 
request of the Australian government, preventing distribu-
tion of its 21st November issue which quoted extracts from 
the book, Documents on Australia Defence and Foreign 
Policy 1968-75 by George Munster and Richard Walsh, a 
book which was the target of many injunctions in Austrialia 
as well . 
The Australian government's injunction which Lord Ave-
bury described as "a totally unwarranted interference in the 
internal affairs of our country", came too late to prevent 
normal distribution of the journal to the bookstalls and the 
mailing of several hundred copies to Australia, though 
several hundred copies still in the warehouse had to be 
withheld. 
In his opening speech, Lord Avebury dealt at length with 
British government pronouncements since 1975 on East 
Timar and concluded that "at the same time as we were 
making all the right noises in public about self-determina-
tion, we knew of, and were conniving with, Indonesian 
aggression". He quoted a letter from Sir John Ford, the 
British Ambassador in Jakarta, dated 21st July 1975, which 
was sent to the Foreign Office with a report on East Timar 
by a senior British Embassy official who had just visited the 
country. The Ambassador wrote: 
The people of Portuguese East Timor are in no condition to 
exercise the right of self-determination . .. The territory seems 
likely to become steadily more of a problem child, and the 
arguments in favour of its integration into Indonesia are all the 
stronger . .. Developments in Lisbon seem now to argue in 
favour of greater sympathy towards Indonesia should the Indo-
nesian Government feel forced to take stronger action. Certainly, 
as seen from here, it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should 
absorb the territory as soon and as unobtrusively as possible; and 
that if it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the UN, we 
should keep our heads down and avoid siding against the Indo-
nesian Gove~nment. 
A request by Lord Avebury that the government make 
public the report sent with the Ambassador's letter, as well 
as other documents relating to British policy on East Timar 
was rejected by the government on the grounds that such 
documents were bound by the "30-year rule" (prohibiting 
publication for 30 years). 
Lord Avebury also raised the case of the murder of 5 
television journalists killed in October 1975 -two of whom 
were British subjects-as an example of duplicity by the 
British government. A cable sent a few days after the 
killing by the Australian Ambassador to his government 
shows that Australia (and clearly Britain too) knew that 
although it is not true, the formal position of the Indonesian 
government is still that there is no military intervention in East 
Timor. If the (Australian Foreign) Minister said or implied in 
public that the Indonesian government was lying, we would 
invite a hurt and angry reply." 
The point at issue was t~e nature of the public response to 
the murders. The Indonesian version was that they were 
killed while sheltering in a house hit by mortar fire, yet, as 
Lord· Avebury pointed out, eye witnesses have said that one 
of the journalists was machine-gunned to death as Indo-
nesian troops entered the village where they were working, 
and that the other four were put up against a wall and shot. 
In February 1976, a government minister gave the House 
of Commons Indonesia's version of the murders, said Lord 
Avebury, who went on: 
The minister meant that he did not want to discover the truth 
because if it were to have been proved that our citizens had been 
cold-bloodedly murdered, there would have been enormous 
public opposition to the cynical policy of encouraging the Indo-
nesians to annex East Timor. 
Yet even despite this, the government minister who 
responded to Lord Avebury's statement in the House of 
Lords once again repeated Indonesia's version of the killings 
and claimed "that the circumstances of their deaths are still 
not clear" 
Referring to Britain's sale of Hawk ground-attack air-
craft to Indonesia, Lord Avebury said these were planes 
that could be used for internal repression. A British govern-
ment spokesperson had recently said in the House of Lords 
that "equipment which, in our judgement, could be used 
for internal repression (would not be sold) to a regime 
which is known to practise torture". Why then were they 
being sold to Indonesia, he asked, which does indeed 
practise torture "on an enormous scale"? 
Supporting Lord Avebury in the debate was the Labour 
lord , Lord Fenner Brockway who strongly attacked Indo-
nesia's occupation of East Timar and pressed for a full 
investigation of present conditions in the country by the 
UN. 
Speaking in support of Indonesia was the Conservative, 
Baroness Vickers who has served for many years as 
president of the Anglo-Indonesia Association. She claimed 
tht since she had made a visit to East Timar recently, on 
the invitation of the Indonesian government, she was in a 
better position to judge the situation. She had, she said, 
met 24 people, including five Portuguese. Arabs and 
Chinese were also present. "They expressed themselves to 
be ... happy with existing conditions." She made a point 
of stressing that there had been no officials present, though 
admitted that she did have an interpreter with her! 
IN MEMORIAM 
We regret to announce the death last September of Jack 
Woddis, a sponsor of TAPOL for several years. He was always 
an enthusiastic supporter of our work and frequently helped 
us with advice. At the time of his death, he was head of the . 
International Department of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain. 
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BABIES DIE IN ACEHNESE PRISONS 
A letter signed "Another Fanatic", written to the Far 
Eastern Economic Review (12th December 1980), 
challenges a report by the journal that Hasan di Tiro, the 
Acehnese separatist leader, is dead. It declares that Jakarta 
has the habit of "killing its enemies several times", and goes 
on: 
"Jakarta is also in the habit of imprisoning the wives and 
children of men who are in the jungle. Two babies died behind 
bars in Aceh after their mothers were arrested." 
The correspondent asserts too that Aceh, in North 
Sumatra, like West Irian and East Timar, is in the process of 
being diluted by Javanese transmigrants in an attempt to 
stamp out support for the cause of Acehnese liberation. 
"That is why all regular Garuda flights to Aceh have been 
cancelled and all aircraft used to carry transmigrants." 
The letter also criticises the Review for stressing that 
almost all important positions in the province's adminis-
tration are in Acehnese hands, and asks: " ... have you 
considered just how little power an Indonesian governor 
has? The moment he pleads for anything that Jakarta 
Continued from page 9. 
the name of his wife and children on the prison wall. 
After they shot him in the stomach he cried "Long live 
the Anti-Communist Movement [ 1] and the blood of 
the innocent citizens of Serramara [2] spilt for the 
future of Timor!" 
The same letter, which was sent from Timar in March 1980, 
three months before the June raids on Dili, also said: 
. . . the people who are still in the bush are now only in 
the eastern zone but I think they will not last much 
longer because there is daily bombing ... Timor was 
previously known as the 'holy red and green island' but 
now it is an island of blood whose sons don't know their 
fathers. 
Food Aid to East Timor to Stop 
Henry Kamm's report in the New York Times is mainly 
concerned with the serious consequences for the Timorese 
of Indonesia's plans for a total cutoff of food aid and the 
phasing out of medical assistance. The two agencies allowed 
to operate, the International Committee of Red Cross and 
the Catholic Relief Services, were being required, he said, to 
winc;l up their activities in East Timar by the end of 1980. 
[The ICRC programme, extended in October 1980 for 
another six months, concentrates on medical assistance to 
people in fourteen areas, while the CRS has only been 
supplying food aid, largely funded by the US government, 
Footnotes: 
1) The Anti-Communist Revolutionary Movement was 
formed in late 1975 by the Trabhalista, UDT, Kota and 
pro-Indonesian Apodeti parties to fight Fretilin, the 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timar. 
2) A reference to Queen Maria Serramara of Lete-foho 
district to whom Martins presumably paid fiefdom. 
doesn 't like, he will be replaced. The real power is with the 
military commanders". It also points out that even though 
the electorate in Aceh gave majority support to the Muslim 
party, PPP, in the 1971 general elections, local government 
is still controlled by GOLK.AR (the Army's electoral plat-
form) and the military. 
* 
GEN ARAL YASIN TO STAND TRIAL 
Retired General Yasin, the man who circulated a document 
early last year exposing the corrupt business practices used 
to set up a cattle-ranch owned in West Java by President 
Suharto, is to be tried on charges of slandering the Head of 
State. Announcing this, the Attorney-General, Lieut.-
General Ali Said said that seven others have been interro-
gated so far in connection with this trial. They include the 
former governor of Jakarta, Ueut.-General Ali Sadikin and 
other retired senior members of the Armed Forces. The 
interrogation of witnesses is still proceeding. (AFP, 23rd 
October 1980) 
not by the Catholic church, while distribution is wholly 
administered by the Indonesian Army (editor, TAPOL).] 
Henry Kamm reports that although both agencies believe 
that East Timor remains greatly in need of help, the Indo-
nesian government has declared the emergency over, and 
has made it quite clear that no food imports into East 
Timor will be permitted after 31st December 1980. (Indo-
nesia itself is the world's largest importer of rice!) Kamm 
thinks there are two reasons for this decision: Indonesia's 
anger over the continued majority support in the UN for 
self-determination in East Timor, and the continuance of 
warfare in the country. (Extensive military operations were 
the reason why relief aid was delayed until late 1979 even 
though it was widely acknowledged in September 1978 that 
starvation and disease were ravaging the population.) 
Kamm quoted an unnamed Timorese contact in Jakarta 
as urging that foreign aid groups try to keep a lasting pres-
ence in East Timor. "If the foreigners leave," he said, "it 
will be tragic for the Timorese people. First, they give 
assistance. And besides, when the foreigners are there, the 
military men are afraid. When they go away, warplanes will 
come back to Timor, and warships also." 
The Christian Science Monitor (17th December 1980) 
reports that in October last year, ten US Senators wrote to 
the Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, about reports of 
continued fighting in East Timor, the jailing of large 
numbers of political prisoners and their concern about 
prison conditions there. They also raised the problem of 
families who have been separated during the conflict in East 
Timor and who have not been able to be reunited. Many 
thousands of Timorese desire to join their relatives now 
living abroad, the letter said, yet few have been allowed to 
leave. 
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BUYUNG NASUTION ON JIUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
During a visit to Holland in December 1980 to attend a seminar on Human Rights and Development Co-
operation arganised by the Dutch aid agency, NO VIB, Mr. Buyung Nasution, Director of the Legal A id 
Institute in Jakarta, gave an interview to De Waarheid, (18th December 1980). The following are some of 
the questions and answers. 
On die 1982 General Elections . 
lk "Yaarheid: Will the released prisoners be allowed to vote? 
Nasution: In principle they should have that right, but a long 
struggle must still be waged. In my opinion, they must in the fust 
place be able to live; that is to say, their economic and social rights 
must be restored. I believe they should also get back their political 
rights even though I oppose the Communist Party and its stand-
point. But if we were to concentrate at the present time on political 
rights, this would only irritate the authorities. 
De W.: But these rights are important, and having to abstain is itself 
a violation of human rights. 
N.: Yes, of course, and the authorities must be made to understand 
that. They are afraid of the Communist Party. Democrats must 
allow their opponents democratic rights, but this will take time. 
On Interior Minister Amir Machmud's call for "vigilance against ex· 
tapols" and Admiral Sudomo's appeal to society to "accept them 
back". 
N.: Machmud's statement is very confusing. He referred in general 
to all ex-tapols and didn't make clear what exactly he meant. He 
was directing suspicions at everyone, from top to bottom. There is 
no unanimity in the government regarding treatment of the ex-
tappols. The ex-tapols face many stresses as a result of prolonged 
detention. Statements such as Machmud's do not help them at all, 
and can only make them nervous and full of anxiety. 
On Remaining A-category prisoners and prisoners under death 
sentence. 
De W .: There are still some A-category prisoners awaiting trial, 
aren't there? 
N.: I can't believe that. The issue is already finished. There is no 
more evidence, there are no more witnesses, and maybe even the 
documents don't exist any more. The big question for me is: how 
much longer can these people be expected to wait. If they are to be 
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tried, it should be done now. If not, they should be considered as 
being eligible for immediate release as a "magnanimous gesture". I 
have criticised those in the West who only speak about the com-
munist prisoners, including Amnesty International. Why limit con-
cerns to the communists? ... There are at present many Muslim 
prisoners, and recently more Muslims have been arrested. 
De W.: From the old Masjumi or Nahdlatul Ulama? 
N.: From both. Suharto is also restricting the freedom of movement 
of Muslims and their organisations. And in the past few years, many 
students have been arrested, some of whom are still prisoners. 
De W.: In a letter to the Indonesian Commission of the Dutch Com-
munist Party, the Dutch Foreign Minister recently said that the 
Indonesian authorities had assured him that the people under death 
sentence would not in fact be executed. 
N.: That's fine, but I think that the important thing is for those 
death sentences to be formally commuted. It would then no longer 
be an internal question for the Indonesian authorities. 
On Press censorship. 
De W .: Has there been any improvement in the past ten or fifteen 
years? 
N.: A little. Some critical articles occasionally appear about social 
problems, especially when worker and peasant delegations visit 
Parliament or the authorities about their complaints. News items 
like this are allowed, but only by the grace of the government. 
There is actually no freedom of the press ... Tight control is exerted 
over the supply of news. Newspapers are prohibited from publishing 
political statements or speeches by me. If I make a defence speech 
in court, this is sometimes reported, but not if I make a speech to 
students, for instance. There is still a black list, which also includes 
General Nasution, Ali Sadikin, Darsono and the poet Rendra. 
Recently, the signatories of the "petition-of-50" were added to the 
list. 
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